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in Baxter v. Wilburn, to the effect that neither past nor
future illicit sexual intercourse will be considered valid
consideration for a contract, will be followed by our law
courts is still unanswered. It would seem, however, that
both by the weight of authority and by the weight of good
reasoning, the rule as there laid down is sound.
LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS AND
TRUSTS FOR THEIR TORTS
State, use of Kalives, v. Eye, Ear and Throat Hospital'
The equitable plaintiffs brought suit as widow and son
of decedent for his wrongful death resulting from alleged
negligence and malpractice on the part of the defendants.
The trial court held that the plaintiffs had not offered
legally sufficient evidence as to the defendant's negligence
and malpractice, and on appeal this ruling was affirmed.
It was, therefore, unnecessary for either court to concern
itself with the corporate defendant's special plea to the
effect that it was an eleemosynary institution organized
solely for charitable purposes for which all its property
was held in trust, and the replication thereto denying that
the hospital was an eleemosynary institution with respect
to the equitable plaintiffs and the decedent, a paying
patient. However, the fact that counsel conceived of the
possibility of a successful attack in Maryland upon the
apparently well-fortified exemption of eleemosynary insti-
tutions from tort claims would seem to justify a review of
the local and general law on the subject of the liability of
charitable trusts and charitable corporations for their torts.
Two Maryland cases dealing with the tort liability of
charitable corporations, have gone far toward establishing
the local law. Perry v. House of Refuge2 first directed the
attention of the Maryland courts to the possibility of the
immunity of charitable corporations from tort claims.
"Embarrassed by an antagonism in the rulings emanating
from other jurisdictions, ' 3 the Court refused an inmate of
a charitable institution recovery for assaults by the agents
of the organization. The decision relied primarily on the
1177 Md. 517, 10 A. (2d) 612 (1940).
263 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).
8 Ibid., 63 Md. 25.
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strength of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross,' decided
in 1846 by the House of Lords of England. In the latter
case a perfectly eligible applicant for admission to a trust-
fund hospital brought suit against the board of trustees
that had voted to reject his application. The House of
Lords stated the usual rule that the mere fact that a person
is a possible beneficiary is not sufficient to entitle him to
maintain a suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust
or to recover damages for its breach, bolstering its opinion
with the dictum that funds created by the benefactors of a
charity should not be diverted from their intended pur-
poses by a suit to recover damages out of the trust prop-
erty. This dictum was repudiated later in England,5 al-
though it has become law in Maryland and some other
American jurisdictions.6
It is to be noted that while the Court of Appeals in the
Perry case relied on and adopted the so-called "trust fund"
theory, it was confronted on the facts by the prospect of
liability on the part of a Good Samaritan7 for the miscon-
duct of its servants to a recipient of its benefactions. With
a noticeable aversion for one's biting the hand that feeds,
the weight of authority even today precludes a recovery
in tort by a recipient of benefits from a charitable institu-
tion where the tort is attributable to an employee of the
institution.' However, one eminent authority finds it dif-
ficult to justify even this exemption.9
The second Maryland decision, Loeffler v. Sheppard-
Pratt Hospital," forced the courts to place the tort im-
munity of charitable corporations squarely on the "trust
fund" theory. This suit, brought by a fireman for injuries
sustained in the discharge of his duties on a defective fire
escape of the charitable institution, differs from its prede-
cessor in that a stranger to (and not a beneficiary of) the
412 Cl. and F. 507 (Eng. 1846). The Maryland court also cited with
approval McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
529 (1876), which applied the same "trust fund" doctrine. England does
not follow the early, unwise dictum of the Heriot case but holds charitable
bodies liable for their torts the same as private bodies. Hillyer v. St.
Bartholomew's Hospital (1909) 2 K. B. 820, 9 B. R. C. 1. See note 14
A. L. R. 572.
'Supra, n. 4.
"McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, supra, n. 4. See also notes 14
A. L. R. 572; 23 A. L. R. 923; Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Sec. 401.
' See Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities (1928) 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
-91, 196 for a comment on the change in the character of the Good
Samaritan.
8 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 402, (3). 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2151.
0 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2152.
10 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917).
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corporation's charity brought action for a tort of the cor-
porate directors themselves (rather than for a wrong of a
servant). By quoting from Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary
Association," the Court reviewed the three doctrines on
which the tort immunity of charities is usually based: the
"respondeat superior inapplicable" theory, the "implied as-
sent" theory and the "trust fund" doctrine. It merely
mentioned the glaring inapplicable rule that the principle
of respondeat superior is not to be invoked against a char-
itable organization since its servants are not engaged in
work for the master's profit, supposedly a requisite for the
operation of the principle. 2  It admitted the inapplica-
bility of the "implied assent" theory, which is based on the
presupposition that a beneficiary of a charitable trust
assumes the risk of negligent injuries inflicted by its serv-
ants, 1 at least by those in whose selection the charity has
exercised due care; 4 and concluded that the only theo-
retical justification for the exemption of the charity lay
here in the previously recognized "trust fund" doctrine.
The Court refused to distinguish between a plaintiff-
stranger and a plaintiff-beneficiary so as to avoid the deci-
sion of Perry v. House of Refuge"2 on its facts, and empha-
sized that the "trust fund" theory was the sole basis for the
decision in that case, relying upon the fact that it was in
recognition of this doctrine only that the Perry6 case was
cited in Weddle v. School Commissioners17 and State v.
Rich,"8 two intervening liability-of-public body cases where
immunity to tort claims was predicated primarily on the
11 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915). This case repudiated the view adopted
by Maryland.
12 But "an individual is absolutely bound to make compensation for any
injury negligently inflicted upon a stranger in the performance of any act
which he undertakes, and the fact that he is actuated by a charitable
motive is immaterial . . . The fact that he organizes a corporation to per-
form his undertaking confers no immunity from liability." 14 A. L. R. 573.
18 "The objection to this theory is that it does violence to the facts. 'A
patient entirely unskilled in legal principles, his body racked with pain, his
mind distorted with fever, is held to know, by intuition, the principle of
law that the courts after years of travail have at last produced.' " (1921)
19 Mich. L. R. 406. The author quotes from the dissenting opinion in
Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 36, 81 S. E. 512 (1914).
1" No Maryland case has dealt with the need of reasonable care in the
selection of servants by a trustee or board of directors, although in Perry
v. House of Refuge, 8upra, n. 2, the court quoted language to that effect
from McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 8upra, n. 4. It is interesting
to note that since the decision in Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital,
235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920), Massachusetts no longer makes even
this requirement-a position contra the great weight of authority.
15 Supra, n. 2.
16 Supra, n. 2.
1794 Md. 334, 51 A. 289 (1902).
18 126 Md. 643, 95 A. 956 (1915).
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theory that the King can do no wrong. 9 Under the facts
of the Loeffler 21 case, the modern view is clearly in favor
of holding the charity liable.2'
There have been no Maryland cases involving the tort
liability of charitable trusts as distinguished from char-
itable corporations. The Restatement of Trusts"2 and reli-
able text-writers23 take the position that since the consid-
erations of public policy are the same in both instances, a
tort-claimant should be permitted to reach the trust fund
under those circumstances which result in the liability
of a charitable corporation. Aside from his action against
the charitable trust the tort-claimant may seek to subject
the trustee to a personal liability similar to that of the
board of management of a charitable corporation-a pos-
sibility which is beyond the scope of this casenote.
Sharing the harsh fate of its concomitant theories, the
"trust fund" doctrine is now under attack on many fronts.
The principal objection to its continued existence is the
feeling that institutions as well as men should be "just
before generous" and that those who establish trust funds
would have it S0.24 From the one extreme of absolute
non-responsibility, 25 at least one jurisdiction has veered to
the opposite pole of liability on the same basis as indi-
viduals or corporations generally.2  Some courts, taking
an intermediate position, emphasize the relation to the
charity of the person injured, holding the charity for a
tort to an employee 27 or to a stranger,28 exempting it from
the tort-claims of beneficiaries 29-at least where the tort
19 For a discussion of the overlapping of the nonliability of governmental
agencies and that of charitable trusts for their torts, see (1921) 6 Corn.
L. Q. 56.21 Supra, n. 10.
2 1
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, Sec. 402; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2151, 2152; Feezer,
op. cit. supra, n. 7.
2 Sec. 402.
21 "While there is a real difference in some respects between the chari-
table trusts and the holding of property absolutely by a charitable corpora-
tion, it is not believed that there should be any distinction between the
two situations as to tort liability. Whatever principles of public policy
and tort law require an exemption from liability in the case of a charitable
corporation should also apply to a trustee for charity, whether the trustee
be incorporated or a private individual." 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,
1243. See also 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS, 2155.
243 SCOTT, TRUSTS, 2150. Feezer, op. cit. supra, n. 7.
22 O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home, 89 Ore. 382, 174 P. 148 (1918) ; Abston
v. Walden Academy, 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351 (1907).
26 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church of Minneapolis, 174 Minn. 389, 219
N. W. 463 (1928).
27 Bruce v. Central Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907).
28 Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 (La. App. 1934).
29 The fact that the recipient of benefits has paid for the services
rendered does not alter the rule of exemption in the great majority of
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is committed by a servant in whose selection the charity
has exercised due care.30  In some cases the courts, refus-
ing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to chari-
ties, separate torts attributable to a servant or agent and
those traceable to a board of directors or trustee.31 Such
exceptions manifest a strong reaction against the "trust
fund" theory. The Restatement of Trusts adopts the rule
of full liability to non-beneficiaries, and denies recovery to
beneficiaries only if the trustee has been personally at
fault.32
In the final analysis it seems that the immunity of elee-
mosynary institutions to tort-claims is grounded on an as-
sumed public policy against the enervation of public chari-
ties, established for the benefit of the whole community, by
compensation of isolated individuals for injuries inflicted
by the negligence of the charities and their agents.33 Such
assumed policy is not even consistent with itself. It must
be remembered that there is a public policy against pre-
venting loss of earning power and property in the case of
the isolated individual or family.34 Moreover, the com-
munity has an interest in obliging every person and every
corporation which undertakes the performance of a duty
to perform it carefully, and there is, therefore, an attend-
ant interest against exempting any such person and any
such corporation (charitable or otherwise) from liability
for its negligence.35
Although the possibility of the disestablishment of the
"trust fund" doctrine in Maryland is probably remote, it
might be observed that the doctrine is one which the Court
of Appeals could change with little violation of the real
purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis,36 should it ever feel
that the modern view represents a better social policy.
It would, of course, always be appropriate to have legis-
lative correction.37
jurisdictions. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 A. 1087
(1910) ; Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1901). But
see Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Assn., supra, n. 11.
30 This exemption is supported by the weight of authority. See 14 C. J.
S. 548, for a list of authorities.
11 Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147. 78 N. E. 855 (1906) Shapiro v.
Jewish Board of Guardians, 165 Misc. 581, 300 N. Y. S. 556 (1937). See
also supra, n. 14
12 Sec. 402, (2) and (3).
3 Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E.
649 (1916) ; Ettlinger v. Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2) 869 (1929).
34 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs, 1244.
35 Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 409. See also (1941) 10 Fordam L. R. 1.
"Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, supra, n. 35.
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